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
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SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF ENEMY STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICTS--ETC(U)
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
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SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF ENEMY STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT:
A STUDY OF FACTIONALISM SINCE THE SIX DAY WAR

by

Alfred L. Monks

and
Kenyon N. Griffin

University of Wyoming

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February 6, 1980

Mr. Harry Schrecengost
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INTRODUCTION

The role of elite perceptions is an important dimension of the Middle East conflict. The significance of perceptions in a nation's foreign policy choices is based on the theoretical assumption that man acts and reacts, not according to reality per se, but to his perceptions of reality. Thus, a decision maker's perceptions of international actors and issues constitute a key component of his definition of the situation and this definition is the basis of foreign policy choices. While studies have provided empirical support for the contention that perceptions are integrally related to a nation's foreign policy, little attention has been devoted to Soviet perceptions of the Middle East conflict. Yet we must assume that these perceptions have previously influenced and continue to influence Soviet foreign policy choices in this area.

The Middle East presents Soviet decision makers with a great challenge. The complexities of this policy issue have stimulated much debate within the Soviet Union, particularly among the Party, the Government and the Military. This debate strengthens the thesis that factionalism exists in a political system that ideologically denies the existence of competing policy influencing groups. If one follows the official party explanation, there are no factional groups in the Soviet Union. An increasing number of Western scholars are questioning this Soviet contention and recent studies have shown that factionalism is evident, especially at the upper decision making level.

The possibility that factional groups exist in the Soviet Union is directly related to the nature of Soviet perceptions. If factional policy influencers are competing to influence foreign policy choices, we would expect them to have different perceptions of the issue. However, if there are no factional groups in the Soviet Union, then we would expect elite perceptions of the Middle East issue to be relatively homogenous.

This paper will examine Soviet perceptions of the Middle East conflict and explore similarities and differences in perceptions held by the Party, the Government, and the Military--the three presumed factional groups. The purpose is to describe Soviet perceptions of targeted enemy states in the Middle East conflict and to evaluate possible factional differences within the Soviet Union in this issue area. The specific analytical focus will be Soviet perceptions of Israel as the primary enemy and the United States and Israel as conjoint enemy states.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The study of factionalism and interest group politics in the Soviet Union is characterized by two dominant themes. First, Soviet authorities officially deny the existence of factionalism while making indirect references to inter-elite and intra-elite differences. Second, Western scholars are contributing to a growing body of literature on Soviet factionalism but they disagree about the bases, influence and legitimacy of factional groups in the Soviet Union. The purpose of this review is to examine these two themes and to relate them to Soviet perceptions of the Middle East conflict.

The classical works on interest group politics assert that individuals in society act largely as members of a group in a political system. This occurs for two basic reasons. First, interest groups or factions consist of persons whose interests, attitudes and behavior are shaped by similar background characteristics. Second, individuals perceive that through cooperative endeavors they will be more likely to attain the goals and rewards which are consistent with their attitudes and interests. Thus individuals with similar backgrounds will join together for collective action. Interest group theory also posits that as societies become more industrialized, interest groups will become more evident, assertive, autonomous and influential in the decision making process.

Soviet View of Factionalism

The underlying logic of interest group politics is as relevant for Soviet society as for Western societies despite the official view that factionalism does not exist in the USSR on any policy issue. In fact, Soviet officials make assiduous efforts to conceal any differences of interests which would vitiate the officially proclaimed monolithic nature of the Soviet leadership.

Factionalism and interest group politics were prevalent in the Leninist period (1918-24) and existed even during the Stalinist period. They became more evident after Stalin's death, particularly with the decline of police terror as a weapon against political opponents and deviant political thinking. Despite efforts to conceal factional differences, Soviet authorities occasionally and indirectly acknowledge the existence of intra-factional differences, but seldom inter-factional ones. When such acknowledgements do appear, they are frequently accomplished in an Aesopian or analogous manner by identifying an earlier historical period and criticizing individuals and groups active during that time.² Through these analogous discussions and criticisms of past factional differences, Soviet leaders offer clues to current conflicts and proposed policies for resolving them. An example of this occurred in 1956-57 when a conflict surfaced between Premier Khrushchev and Defense Minister Zhukov. The Party press printed articles on the struggle between Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin between 1923 and 1925.

The charges leveled in the Party press against Trotsky were the official charges made against Zhukov following his demotion in 1957.

A more recent example of the use of historical analogy occurred in 1974. Several articles appeared in the Soviet press describing a factional conflict in 1919-21. Brezhnev's name was invoked in the articles to buttress the thesis that the conflict should not be interpreted simply as historical description but as current Party guidance in dealing with current Party differences.

Reading the Soviet press is a difficult task when one attempts to penetrate the veil surrounding the manifest content and examine the latent meaning. This is particularly true in deciphering the meaning of inter-factional debate. A recent example surfaced in May, 1974, between the Government and the Party over the character of the Party and the nature of its decision making apparatus. During this period the Communist Party was issuing new Party cards to all CPSU members and the reissuance involved a minor purge. Izvestiya, the official Government organ, took the occasion of the Seventieth Anniversary of Lenin's work on party principles ("One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward") to criticize the Party.

The paper reported that Lenin had stressed iron discipline, centralized leadership, subordination of lower party organs to higher organs and an elitist party. It noted that opportunist, anti-Leninist factions purportedly had opted for a loosely organized, highly diffused party of the masses in which easy compromises and indecisiveness in decision making were prevalent. The timing and the nature of the criticism from the Government newspaper suggest the conclusion that significant differences exist between the two interest groups.

Western Interpretations of Factionalism

The official denial regarding interest group politics and the indirect acknowledgement of factionalism by Soviet authorities provide some insights into the conceptual and substantive difficulties in understanding the bases, influence, and legitimacy of factions in the Soviet Union. This situation has undoubtedly contributed to the lack of consensus among scholars on these three topics.

The origins of Soviet factionalism focus on the foundations of specific interest groups. Most academic discussion centers on the relative impact of organizational ties and policy issues as cohesive factors necessary for factionalism to develop. A number of scholars, including Zbigniew Brzezinski,³ contend that occupational or institutional lines furnish the primary basis for interest groups in the Soviet Union. This contention is supported by the assumption that organizational interests of the Party, the Military, government bureaucracies, industrial managers and the police are relatively homo-

genous and that the actions of each faction can be explained largely in terms of enhancing the interests of the entire group. In contrast to this approach, Carl Linden and others view factionalism as being based not only on organizational ties but also on specific policy issues.⁴ Supporters of this approach posit that interests cross occupational lines, and therefore political activities of factions should be understood both in terms of institutional affiliation and policy issues.

The above approaches differ not only on the role of policy issues but also on the assumption of institutional homogeneity. Supporters of the approach linking organizational ties and policy issues generally reject this assumption or in some way modify it. This assumption is rejected by those scholars who conceptualize factions more in terms of their "sub-groups" or as intra-factional groups rather than as reified aggregate interest groups. Gordon Skilling and David Lane concur with this need to analyze groups not as homogeneous factions sharing the same interests but as relatively heterogeneous entities.⁵ William Griffith's position is somewhat similar when he argues that an interest group should be conceptualized as a "grouping" or a set of tendencies regarding similar activities or expectations on an issue which may clash with other tendencies.⁶ Roman Kolkowicz and Thomas Wolfe also reject the notion of institutional homogeneity in the Soviet Union when they assert that the Soviet military is far from monolithic since it is frequently divided on such issues as military tactics, strategy and doctrine. Vernon Aspaturian modifies the homogeneity assumption when he argues that there is considerable overlapping of Soviet groups, depending on the issue. However, he contends that the Military is more homogeneous in outlook than the more heterogeneous Party.⁸

The influence of interest groups on policy choices in the Soviet Union is also evaluated and interpreted differently by Western scholars. Some emphasize the Party's domination and control of all aspects of Soviet society and the inherent weaknesses of other factions. While proponents of this position acknowledge the potential for debate and bargaining--strategies common in the West--they argue that these techniques are simply manipulated by the Party leadership or arise only during periods of leadership crisis when central guidance is in flux.

Another group of scholars reject the above contention and argue that several Soviet factions can and do influence policy choices. Alexander Dallin and Phillip Stewart, among others, assert that "strategically located" groups, including the party appratchiki, military, government departments, and industrial managers, exert considerable influence over policy outcomes.⁹

There is notable disagreement among those who believe that interest group politics influence the decision making process. For instance, Robert Wesson has suggested that while Party bodies make policy decisions, and groups outside the Party generally act only as consultants, occasionally strategically located groups have caused the Party to revise its policies.¹⁰

Michael Tatu's interpretation of factional influence focuses on changes in the decision making process. He asserts that the party apparatchiki and the industrial managers, which have been the most influential factions, exert influence through their representation in the Politburo. But he concludes that the military and the police are becoming increasingly more influential.¹¹ Vernon Aspaturian states that in addition to the above groups, the state bureaucracy possesses a powerful political lever of great potential and long range significance for influencing Soviet policy outcomes.¹²

Specialists of Soviet military affairs, including Kolkowicz, Gart-hoff, Wolfe and Gallagher, cite similar conclusions for the military's influence on Soviet policy decisions.¹³ Their contention is that the Military exerts considerable influence in high level policy making and in the formation of strategic policies. Malcolm MacKintosh is more modest about the Military's influence, but states that key Soviet decision makers have become more accessible to the military faction and, therefore, military influence is predominant when key decision makers need military support such as during a crisis.¹⁴

Some students of Soviet affairs, including Fainsod, Hough, Aspaturian and Jacobs, go even further in support of interest group politics by arguing that the influence of competing policy influencers have changed the basic decision making structure in the Soviet Union.¹⁵ They assert that because of increasing factionalism, and the influence of the interest groups, the CPSU has been transformed into a broker which mediates competing and divergent group interests.

These alternative interpretations of factional influence relate closely to scholarly interpretations of the legitimacy of factional or interest group activity in the Soviet context. On the one hand, those who see factions with minimal influence ascribe to the view that interest groups are illegitimate. Two justifications are cited for this interpretation by Laird, Brzezinski, Barghoorn, Armstrong, Wesson and Osborn.¹⁶ First, they emphasize the illegitimacy of such activities as stipulated in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Second, they stress the Party's dominant role in Soviet society and the subordination of lower political organs to higher ones. Their conclusion is that ideological doctrine and political organization serve as powerful obstacles to independent group actions.

On the other hand, those who concur that interest groups do influence policy choices also agree with the contention that factionalism is implicitly accepted as a legitimate activity by most Soviet decision makers. Proponents of this interpretation, including Skilling, Hough, Dallin, Fainsod and Aspaturian, argue that Soviet modernization in the post-Stalinist period has contributed to a greater freedom for group discussion on many issues.¹⁷ While they caution that this change does not imply the same degree of freedom enjoyed by Westerners, they agree that debates on important policy issues has resulted in pressures on the Party. The acceptance of such open debate has been one of the most salient features of post-Stalin Soviet society.

Implications for This Study

The preceding discussion has reviewed alternative interpretations of factionalism in the Soviet Union. Several implications for our analysis of Soviet perceptions of enemy states in the Middle East were suggested. These implications also serve as a partial justification of our analysis. First, the review suggests that the Soviet authorities attempt to conceal any significant evidence of interest group politics. But at the same time, the society during the post-Stalinist period has become more open and some policy debate does appear. Second, evidence, both from Soviet verbal statements and from Western scholars, suggests that inter- and intra-factional differences do exist.

Therefore, we believe that an analysis based on verbal statements from the Soviet press, published by three previously identified factions--Party, Government, and Military--will provide new evidence about factional differences in the Soviet Union. Our focus will be on inter-elite factions; intra-factional differences will not be considered. Implicitly, we are neither rejecting the relevance of intra-factional conflict nor attempting to reify the Party, Government, or Military. It is simply a choice of analytical focus which we believe the literature supports. Our analysis will indirectly permit us to evaluate the relative influence of these groups on policy choices in the Middle East and thereby reflect on the legitimacy of factionalism in the Soviet Union today.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The Data

The data for the analysis are derived from a content analysis of the three major Soviet newspapers: Pravda, Izvestiya, and Krasnaya zvezda. These newspapers were selected because each is the official publication of the Communist Party, the Government and the Military respectively. Perceptions of the Middle East conflict are inferred from the content of statements made in these official publications. It is important to emphasize that by relying on newspapers as written records we have tapped expressed attitudes. Whether such expressions of sentiment reflect actual perceptions is a much debated question. Our analysis is premised on the assumption that published statements are equivalent to perceptions.

The data base extends from July, 1967, through December, 1974. This time period has been particularly significant for Middle East actors as well as the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviets have been particularly concerned with their influence in the area, their relationship with the Arab states, the status of Israel, both in the Middle East and American politics, and with the role of the United States as a military supplier of Israel and as a peace making force.

The coding procedure involved two distinct steps. First, each newspaper was scanned for articles which dealt with the Middle East. Only articles originating in each publication were coded; TASS articles were thus eliminated. This prevented an article from being coded twice (once in an originating newspaper and again as a reprinted article in another paper) and enabled us to focus on perceptions unique to each organization. Second, after identifying a relevant article, it was analyzed and the following information noted: (1) Newspaper--Pravda, Izvestiya, or Krasnaya zvezda; (2) Date--day, month and year; and (3) Targeted Enemy--Israel, the United States and Israel, or other enemy.

During the period July 1, 1967, through December 31, 1974, 1,891 articles were coded. Pravda had the greatest number (876), followed by Izvestiya (734) and Krasnaya zvezda (177). Because of the differing numbers of observations, we decided to base the analysis on proportional attention devoted to each topic under discussion. Empirically, Krasnaya zvezda devotes less attention to foreign policy issues, but we assume that what they say is as important, particularly in studying factionalism, as the other papers. By focusing on relative attention through percentages we are able to have a more accurate indicator given our analytical focus.

Framework for the Analysis

For the purposes of this paper, it is necessary both to describe the significance of Soviet perceptions of the targeted enemy states in the Middle East conflict and to analyze the perceptions held by the Party, Government and the Military. The first task is simply descriptive; Soviet perceptual patterns of enemy states will be plotted on charts and the general trends discussed.

The second task is more analytical and the technique more sophisticated than the first. Here the task is to explore similarities and differences between the perceptions held by the three Soviet groups. In order to evaluate the salience of the perceptions held by each elite, it is necessary to measure the association between the perceptual patterns of the Party and Government and the Party and the Military. Using correlational analysis, we will examine the degree of association or similarity between the above patterns based on two different time frames: (1) the seven and one-half period based on data for 30 quarters; and (2) yearly periods beginning in July, 1967, based on data for relevant quarters.

We contend that if there is little or no factionalism, the perceptions held by the Party, Government and Military should be similar or identical. Statistically, this means that the correlation coefficients should be very high, say at the .70 level and above. However, if there is factionalism between the groups then there would be greater differences in the perceptual patterns and the salience of the perceptions held by each group. While it is difficult to establish firm decisional

rules for such analysis, any correlations below .50 would seem sufficiently weak to justify theoretically the existence of inter-elite cleavage.

The correlations for two different time periods provide the greatest possible information regarding perceptual similarities between the groups. The correlations based on the seven and one-half years since the Six Day War give one summary measure of elite similarities. However, by correlating shorter time frames--in this case, one year periods--it is possible to gain greater sensitivity toward short term factional differences. In analyzing the statistical measures, it is well to remember the assumption that even the most hostile lovers and spouses, like nations and factions within nations, experience an ebbing and flowing of disagreements. Even between the worst enemies there are some common interests. Therefore, we would expect that the perceptions held by various interest groups would be more similar at one time and reveal greater differences at others.

Limitations of the Study

The research problem and the methodological approach employed in this study pose potential limitations which should be specified before turning to the analysis. First, there is the question of whether official statements can be used as a basis for perceptual data. Second, there is the related question of whether the three Soviet newspapers in fact reflect the expressed attitudes of the respective organizations. Third, the analysis assumes relative homogeneity within the Party, Government and Military groups, and ignores possible intra-factional differences. Fourth, the data and the analysis focus on perceptual patterns at the expense of behavioral patterns. Thus, while it would seem that perceptions would lead to commensurate behavior, one should be aware of possible deviations in the perceptual-behavioral linkages. Although we explicitly reject the limitations suggested by these questions, our analysis implicitly reflects our recognition of such basic problems.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF ENEMY STATES

Statements targeting or identifying enemy states on foreign policy issues are commonly found in the Soviet press. Such statements provide an important indicator of the perceptions held by Soviet elites of the major enemy states or adversaries through the world. Two distinct perceptual patterns of enemy states emerge from the Soviet press statements concerning the Middle East issue. One pattern involves the targeting of a primary enemy alone; a second pattern identifies a primary enemy and adds a secondary enemy state. When the first pattern occurs, Israel is virtually always targeted as the primary enemy state. (The United States was identified as the primary enemy in only twelve cases over the seven and one half year time frame selected for the analysis. When the

second pattern emerges, the Soviets usually target both the United States and Israel as enemies. Sometimes the United States is noted as the primary enemy and Israel the secondary, while at other times the reverse combination is evident.

This distinction between the two perceptual patterns appears particularly significant since it relates to the functions of such targeting. We presume that the functions of such targeting statements are informational, educational, and political for both domestic and foreign readers of the Soviet press. When enemy states are identified in the public press on foreign policy issues, such as involvement in the Middle East, it is to identify for the potential audience the states which are either exacerbating the conflict or obstructing peace efforts. Therefore, when Israel is singled out as the primary enemy state it reveals a perception that Israel alone is complicating the Middle East conflict. In contrast, when the United States is included in the targeting statement, it indicates Soviet perception of hostility or discontent with both the United States and Israel for their allegedly nefarious activities in the Middle East issue, including the thwarting of Soviet objectives there.


The following discussion will explore Soviet perceptions of Israel and the United States as enemy states and then will examine the perceptions held by the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the Military. This approach will illustrate changing Soviet perceptions of enemy states in the Middle East conflict and allow us to evaluate similarities and differences among the perceptions held by the three groups and the implications of these for factionalism in the Soviet Union.

Soviet Perceptions of Enemy States

Soviet perceptions of the enemy states in the Middle East conflict are illustrated in Chart I. The data were collapsed into quarterly periods and the proportion of all targeting statements for the two patterns are plotted on the chart. Between July 1, 1967, and December 31, 1974, there were 1787 articles in the Soviet press which targeted enemy states in the Middle East. Of this total, 39 per cent identified Israel as the primary enemy and 37 percent targeted the United States and Israel as conjoint enemies. The remaining 24 per cent linked Israel as an enemy state either to Western European nations specifically, or to unidentified states or combinations of unidentified states. We are solely concerned with the first two patterns; they are more distinct, based on greater attention devoted to them and they present the most specific, least ambiguous targets.

Turning to the chart, we can identify three distinct trends between 1967 and 1974. Between July, 1967, and June, 1969, Soviet elite perceptions of Israel as the primary enemy received increasing attention. The conjoint targeting pattern identifying the United States and Israel declined. The second period--June, 1969 through March, 1972--reveals an

CHART I SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES AS ENEMY STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST



important crossover in the pattern targeting Israel alone and the United States and Israel conjointly between the third and fourth quarters of 1969. Preceding this crossover, the Soviet elites targeted Israel much more frequently than the United States and Israel. The greatest difference between the two patterns occurred during the second quarter of 1969 when 68 per cent of all targeting statements identified Israel and only 17 per cent targeted the United States and Israel conjointly. The chart illustrates the complete reversal of this trend in the fourth quarter of 1969 and continuing until March, 1972. During this period more than 50 per cent of all targeting was directed toward both the United States and Israel--69 per cent of the statements was the high.

The third trend becomes apparent during the first quarter of 1972 and continues through 1974..Here again a crossover is noted in the perceptual patterns--this time in April, 1972. The conjoint targeting pattern moves downward with increasingly less attention devoted to the United States and Israel as enemy states. The most salient time segment during this period occurred between October and December, 1973 when more than 74 per cent of all targeting statements were directed toward Israel.


The trends manifested during these three periods, and the variations of the trends, are sensitive indicators of changing Soviet perceptions of enemy actors and their behavior in the Middle East. The causal factors of these changes are found in (1) developments in bilateral relations between the Soviets and their Arab client states as well as in the American-Israeli relationship; (2) developments between the Arabs and Israel, and finally, (3) developments in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the analytical focus of this paper is not on the causes of these trends but rather on possible elite factionalism as reflected in these perceptions, we will move to the discussion of the similarities and differences between the perceptions held by the Soviet elites of Israel and the United States as enemy states in the Middle East.

Factionalism Among Soviet Elite Groups

The salience of Soviet perceptions of targeted enemy states in the Middle East conflict changed considerably between July, 1967 and December, 1974. These changes clearly suggest the dynamic nature of Soviet perceptions on foreign policy issues. These changes are also reflected in the perceptions held by the Communist Party, the Government, and the Military. Chart II depicts these three groups' perceptions of Israel as the primary enemy state in the Middle East and Chart III portrays their perceptions of the United States and Israel as conjoint enemy states.

A comparison of the aggregate data reflecting Soviet perceptions of Israel's role in the Middle East with the disaggregate perceptions held by each group reveals several interesting findings. First, we see

CHART II. PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAEL AS THE PRIMARY ENEMY STATE



that the Party and Government devote a greater proportion of their targeting statements to Israel than does the Military. Forty-four per cent of the Government statements and 40 per cent of the Party statements identified Israel as the primary enemy; this compares to only 21 per cent for the Military. As illustrated in the chart, in only three quarters--third quarter, 1969, second quarter 1970, and third quarter, 1971--did the military targeting rank higher than the Party targeting.


Second, we discern a greater similarity between the Party/Government patterns than between the Party/Military patterns. The most significant deviations between Party and Government occur during the third quarters of 1969 and 1973. Military targets of Israel are at a higher level than the Party in only two quarters: third quarter, 1963, and second quarter, 1969. The differing perceptual patterns are reflected in the statistical analysis. Correlations between the Party and the Government's perceptions of Israel as the primary enemy in the Middle East was $r = .61$; this compares to $r = .38$ between the Party and the Military. These correlations are not as strong as one would expect if there were a homogeneous view of the role of Israel in the Middle East. We suggest that it indicates factional differences in interests in the Middle East and differences in perceptions.

Additional support for this conclusion is suggested in the correlations for the shorter time spans. By analyzing the total time frame by years beginning in July, 1967, we gain a feel for the truly dynamic nature of each group's perceptions, and presumably, interests. These correlations are listed by year on the bottom of Chart II. We cannot do an in depth analysis of each period but it is important to note the range of association. For the Party and the Government, the correlation for the entire period since the Six Day War was $r = .61$. However, broken down by year, we see a range between $r = -.82$ for the period in 1973-74 to an $r = .96$ for the 1971-72 year. A similar correlational pattern is evidenced between the Party and the Military although the range is not so great. In the period immediately following the Six-Day War an $r = -.16$ is noted as the period of greatest disagreement and an $r = .72$ represents the period with greatest agreement.

In conclusion, the differences in perceptual patterns which target Israel as the primary enemy in the Middle East conflict are sufficiently great as to indicate that factional differences must underlie these perceptual differences, at least on this dimension of the issue.

Chart III illustrates the Party, the Government and the Military perceptions of the United States and Israel as conjoint enemy states. The patterns in this chart can be compared with those found in Charts I and II. Chart I reveals the basic pattern: Soviet perceptions of Israel as the primary enemy state became more salient between July, 1967, and June, 1969. Between July, 1969 and March 1972, this pattern reversed. The conjoint pattern became much more significant than statements targeting Israel alone. Finally, the period beginning in

CHART IIII PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL AS CONJOINT ENEMY STATES



April, 1972 evidenced another crossover when the salience of Israel as the primary enemy increased and the conjoint pattern with the United States declined dramatically.

Chart III disaggregates the Soviet elite perceptions of the United States and Israel as conjoint enemy states which were outlined in Chart I. Several generalizations should be noted about the perceptions reflected in these patterns. First, we note that the Military devotes a greater proportion of its targeting statements to the conjoint pattern than it does to Israel as the primary enemy. Forty-five percent of the Military's targeting statements target the United States and Israel. This compares with 35 per cent for the Party and 38 per cent for the Government. Perhaps more importantly, the Military's targeting of the conjoint enemy states is more than double (45 percent vs. 21 per cent) its targeting of Israel alone. Thus, the inclusion of the United States as a targeted enemy state is highly significant to the Military.

Second, we note that the patterns between the Party and the Government are more similar than the patterns between the Party and the Military. The perceptual patterns held by the Party and the Government follow the same basic trend quite closely until the period between July, 1972, and June, 1974; during this time there were several deviations. The patterns between the Party and the Military differed from the trends established by the Party and the Government. Four such deviations should be noted: (1) first, second and third quarters of 1968; (2) fourth quarter, 1969; (3) fourth quarter, 1971; and (4) fourth quarter, 1973 and all four quarters, 1974.

These patterns and the similarities and differences between them are reflected in the statistical relationships. The correlation between the Party and the Government for the period July, 1967, to December, 1974, was $r = .79$; the correlation for the Party and the Military pattern of the United States and Israel as conjoint enemies was $r = .26$. These statistics suggest that over the entire period there were not great factional differences in the perceptions of the Party and the Government, but rather a strong agreement between the two elites on the changing salience of the United States and Israel as enemy states. The correlations between the Party and the Military's perceptions reveal a low degree of association and suggest that there was significant factional difference between these elites on the role of the United States with Israel in the Middle East conflict.

The correlational analysis of the perceptual patterns between the Soviet elites for yearly periods beginning in July, 1967, lends additional support to the general conclusions about factionalism. These correlations reveal a generally high degree of similarity between the Party and Government perceptions of the United States and Israel as enemy states. This general agreement is evidenced between July, 1967, and June, 1972, but breaks down during the period July, 1972 through June, 1974. This shift in perceptions appears to be related to Leonid Brezhnev's emphasis on detente policies with the United States, a policy favored by the Party. The Government, which provides Soviet economic

leadership, opposed Brezhnev's plans to increase allocations for consumer goods while reducing military spending during 1972. Since detente sought to achieve economic and political gains related to the above issues, it seems logical that the Government and the Party would display strong disagreement over the policy questions.

The much lower correlation ($r = .26$) between the Party and the Military indicates more perceptual differences than were found between the Party and the Government. In fact, only during the periods July, 1969, through June, 1970, and July, 1971 through June, 1972, were there strong similarities between the perception held by the Party and the Military ($r = .75$ and $r = .70$ respectively). During the first and second years after the June, 1967 War, the correlations suggest strong factional differences ($r = .25$ and $r = .19$); this same pattern is reflected during the fourth year after the war ($r = .27$) and the sixth and seventh years ($r = .00$ and $r = -.66$).

The above analysis suggests that factional differences in the perceptions of the United States and Israel as conjoint enemy states is much greater between the Party and the Military than for the Party and the Government. In analyzing the shorter time periods to illustrate potential factional differences during specific periods, we found only two yearly periods when the Party and Government had significant deviations in their perceptual patterns (July, 1972, to June, 1974). Likewise we found only two periods when the Party and Military did not have significant deviations in their perceptual patterns targeting the United States and Israel as conjoint enemies. Finally, it is important to note that during the period between July, 1972, and June, 1974, the Party experienced a time when both the Government and the Military held similar perceptions of the conjoint enemies, perceptions which deviated from the Party's perception.

Background of the Perceptions: March 1972-December 1974

Soviet perceptions of enemy states in the Middle East conflict are based on diverse international events and the impact of those events on domestic politics and political factions. Using the perceptions held by the Party, Government, and the Military, we want to evaluate the influence of these groups on policy choices and comment on the legitimacy of factionalism in the Soviet Union. We will focus this discussion on the period between April 1972 and December 1974.

A review of Chart I reveals that the salience of the Soviet perception of Israel as the primary target increased dramatically while the salience of the conjoint targeting pattern declined. During this period it is obvious that changes were evolving in the international setting which had a noticeable impact on Soviet domestic politics. The most significant of these developments appears to have been the initiation of detente policies between the United States and the Soviet Union. Other developments probably played an important role during this period as well, including changes in Soviet-Arab relations, Arab-Israeli interactions, and Arab-American relations. Perceptions of Israeli and American role in the Middle East are depicted in Charts II and III. After April, 1972 we have noted that the Israelis are targeted as the primary enemy more than the United States and Israel as conjoint enemy states.

The sharp shift in perceptions of the Party and the Government in the June 1972-June 1974 period suggests that something dramatic must have occurred to alter these perceptions. Since the Soviet government in general is more concerned with domestic affairs than foreign matters, it is possible that the major causal factor lay in economic policy. Yet domestic politics, as in any state, are inextricably linked with foreign policies. It is possible that the major contributing factor for this perceptual shift is to be found in a policy having both foreign and domestic consequences. We argue that this policy was detente with the USA and its implications for the Soviet economy. It was during the July 1972-June 1974 period that Mr. Brezhnev was pushing his new policy of detente with the USA and his related policies of reducing arms spending and increasing allocations for consumer goods spending. This raises the question of whether the General Secretary was encountering opposition from the Soviet Government to his conviction that the Soviet-American detente would yield political and economic benefits which would accrue to the advantage of the other two policies cited above. It is the Soviet government, along with the CPSU, which is responsible for the drawing up of the economic plans and for their execution. In December 1971, when the current five-year plan was drawn up, more emphasis was placed, for the first time, on the consumer goods sector of the economy than on heavy, presumably reflecting the desires of Brezhnev. Yet, within two years, the balance was dramatically reverse in favor of the latter. Premier Kosygin warned Soviet planners at that time that dissipation of investment over an excessive number of projects would have to end. Today

an uneasy equilibrium between the two sectors prevails. It would be claiming far too much to assert that a power struggle is taking place between the CPSU and the Soviet government over economic priorities. But it can be argued from our evidence that divergent, and at times, conflicting Party and Government perceptions of the Mideast conflict may have reflected differing views of these two groups over the desirability of a Soviet-American detente as a major force in Soviet economic development.

The sharply lower correlations for the Party and the Military, beginning in July 1972, suggesting a strong degree of factionalism are related to a growing debate over basic questions between the Brezhnev faction and the more "hawkish" military faction and its militant supporters in the Politburo. This debate is related to important policy questions and deserves close attention. The positions of the two factions can be summarized as follows: the Brezhnev group asserts that a new era in world relations has been ushered in, beginning with the Moscow Summit in May 1972, in which the basis of Soviet power and of its foreign policy lies in world peace, detente with the USA, in improved relations with all capitalist and neutralist states; the Brezhnev faction also argues that any nuclear war, whether "just" or not, would mean the end of civilization and that preservation of all societies must be sought. The underpinning of this approach is the thesis that the USA has become less "imperialistic".

The Soviet military and its supporters argue that the world must still be viewed as a struggle between capitalism and socialism, that the basis of Soviet power lies in a strong military, that wars, any wars, are "just", provided that they are fought in defense of socialism and communism, and that the USSR could survive a nuclear attack, that support of the national liberation movement is one of the functions of the Soviet armed forces, and that detente with the USA is risky. The basic underpinning of this group's thinking is the conviction that the USA is as "imperialistic" as ever.

The impetus for the Brezhnev faction was the Moscow Summit talks in May 1972. At that time both states signed an agreement limiting the growth of strategic weapons and a declaration of basic principles guiding Soviet-American relations.

The Soviet military launched its campaign against the Brezhnev faction in a series of articles in Red Star, the military daily, in early April 1973. This had been preceded by a hard-line speech of Marshal A. Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister, on March 27. Grechko asserted that the main obstacle to peace was and remains imperialism, and that one must deal with it by force. The Red Star series raised an issue directly related to key parts of the Brezhnev position - arms reduction and detente with the USA. The issue was whether war is still a continuation of politics by other means. The debate on the relationship between war and politics had surfaced at the time of Khrushchev's overthrow as camouflage for the political debate which led to his ouster. If nuclear

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war is devastating as to be inconceivable, as the Khrushchev ~~doves~~ had argued, and as the Brezhnev faction was now doing, then no political purposes can be served by a nuclear war. Consequently, emphasis must be placed on arms reduction and detente with the USA. But the military press in April and May, 1973, and again in September, asserted that war was still a continuation of politics. In the May article, Red Star referred to "disagreements", "distortions", and "certain errors" about the alleged futility of nuclear wars.

Upon his return from his Washington Summit talks in June, Mr. Brezhnev referred to a "new international system," and "new relations" with the USA requiring "new" approaches. Also in the summer of 1973, Pravda began publishing articles extolling the manifold advantages to be gained by the Soviet Union in its relationship with the USA.

The strength of the military opposition to Brezhnev is evident from the fact that factional conflict was revived in September 1973. The military press raised the same issues debated in the spring, with the difference, however, that the problems were more squarely faced: "different" views had arisen concerning the value of the arms accord and detente. The outbreak of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 provided Mr. Brezhnev with a fresh opportunity to extol the advantages of the Soviet-American detente. Yet it also gave additional evidence of Soviet factionalism, as hard-line statements were made by Grechko and Politburo member Shelepin. The military's opposition to Brezhnev detente policy continued unabated in 1974. Marshal Grechko's hard-line statements in April about the dangers of imperialism, and his policy statements in early June, backed by Admiral Gorshkov's thesis, advanced in May, about the urgent need for a qualitative lead in Soviet arms development and the folly of a new arms accord with the USA, reflect this posture.

In sum, we believe that our evidence of divergent perceptions of the Party, Military, and Government, on select dimensions of the Midas conflict indicate that factionalism exists in the Soviet Union. Our findings further suggest that the Soviet Military is a faction, which may exercise the same kind of influence on policy making as does the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US. Our results thus reject the thesis advanced by some Western specialists that there are no essential differences between the defense establishment and the Party, and that the USSR is a military state, whose economy is set up to serve military needs and that Grechko and Brezhnev are in league with each other.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper has been to describe Soviet perceptions of targeted enemy states in the Middle East conflict and to evaluate possible factional differences within the Soviet Union on this issue area. Using perceptual data based on Soviet newspapers published by the Party, the Government and the Military respectively, we were able to show that perceptions of Israel as the primary enemy and the United States and Israel as conjoint enemies possess a dynamic quality. This quality, which is reflected in changes in the salience of the two perceptions, is linked to diverse international developments in the Middle East and elsewhere. It is particularly interesting that during the last two years after the initiation of the Soviet-American detente the salience of the conjoint targeting pattern linking the United States and Israel declined significantly while the perception of Israel as the primary enemy became more salient.

The data also permitted an analysis of possible factional differences among three interest groups. Based on correlational techniques, we were able to support the contention that factional differences (as reflected in perceptual data) do exist in the Soviet Union. The Party and Military disagreement is sufficiently great to merit this conclusion. However, the correlational analysis between the Party and the Government during the period following the Six Day War suggests much less factionalism, fewer factional differences. Further, we were able to suggest that in addition to organizational ties and policy issues, factional analysis should focus on the time factor. Our data indicate that by analyzing a specific perception for relatively short periods, factional differences would emerge during one period only to be resolved during a later period. This conclusion is more appropriate, of course, for Party-Government perceptions than for Party-Military perceptions.

What implications does this analysis have for ascertaining the relative impact of the Party, the Government and the Military, and, consequently the legitimacy of interest group politics in the Soviet Union? First, it appears that the possibility of bargaining does exist in the decision making process. Second, the correlations reported on Charts II and III suggest an interesting question about possible bargaining not just between the Party and the Government or the Military, but with the Government and Military when these two interest groups hold similar perceptions which run counter to the Party's. Finally, our analysis supports the interpretation that interest group politics, though officially denied, are accepted as a legitimate activity in the Soviet Union. While the parameters for acceptable activities are no doubt narrow, they are wide enough for at least minimal discussion of policy issues in the elite press.

APPENDIX I CORRELATIONS OF PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY PERCEPTIONS OF MAJOR THEMES IN SOVIET PRESS

	1967-68	1968-69	1969-70	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1967-1974
Party/Govt	-.63	.52	.89	.95	.49	.48	.59	.59
Party/MIL	.36	.38	.65	-.02	.58	-.02	-.45	.29
Govt/MIL	.09	.70	.92	-.28	-.10	.83	.33	.37
Party/Govt	.87	.65	.96	-.05	.13	.82	.60	.63
Party/MIL	-.20	.60	.87	-.73	*	*	.34	.46
Govt/MIL	-.42	.35	.94	.55	*	*	.00	.40
Party/Govt	.80	.31	-.03	.87	.42	.31	-.31	.39
Party/MIL	.87	.35	.63	-.62	.86	-.01	-.19	.34
Govt/MIL	.95	.66	.30	-.77	.20	-.70	.93	.13

*Because of a limited number of observations, correlation coefficients could not be computed for these periods.